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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY: WHEN DO INSTITUTIONS
MATTER?
RONALD J. GILSON*
Until the 1980s, corporate governance was largely the province of
lawyers. It was a world of specific rules-more or less precise statutory
requirements governing shareholder meetings, the election of directors,
notice requirements and the like-that were essentially unrelated to what
corporations actually do. From this perspective, the corporation's productive
activity was simply a black box onto which standard governance structures
were superimposed with little effect on what took place within. Corporate
law was "trivial' or, as Bayless Manning so evocatively portrayed it,
simply "great empty corporation statutes-towering skyscrapers of rusted
girders internally welded together and containing nothing but wind."2
The turmoil of the 1980s brought corporate governance out of the
shadow of purely legal analysis. Economists became interested in how
corporations make decisions, the incentives and utility functions of the
decision makers, and the feedback mechanisms by which corporate
performance is evaluated and responsively adjusted. The new attention was
motivated by the growing perception of a link between corporate gover-
nance and corporate performance. According to the hypothesis, better
governance yields more efficient production.
Large institutional differences between the corporate governance systems
of the three most successful industrial economies made salient the possible
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Marc and Eva
Stem Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University. This paper builds on Ronald Gilson,
Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, in ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Mats
Isaksson & Rolf Skog eds., 1994), and on extensive conversations and continuing joint research with
Mark Roe. An earlier version of this article was presented at a Conference on the Influence of Corporate
Governance and Financing Structures on Economic Performance, sponsored by the French Ministry of
Industry, Postal Services and Telecommunications and External Trade, OECD, and the Corporate
Governance Forum, Sweden, for whose support of my research I am very grateful. Victor Goldberg,
Joseph Grundfest, and Michael Klausner also provided very helpful comments.
I. Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 542 (1990).
2. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
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link between governance and efficiency. German corporate governance is
said to be bank-centered: Universal banks simultaneously serve as lenders,
shareholders, investment fund managers, investment bankers and superviso-
ry board members. Those who favor bank-centered corporate governance
argue that the bank's multi-dimensional role allows both more efficient
lending, because the bank's special position reduces the information
asymmetries between the company and the capital market, and more
effective monitoring of management, because of the access and incentives
that result from the bank's multiple roles Japanese governance is also
said to be bank-centered but with the addition of cross-shareholdings
among a group of corporations that, because shareholdings often parallel
intra-group product sales, provide an additional monitoring mechanism. 4
And in both Germany and Japan, capital market monitoring through hostile
takeovers, characteristic of United States stock market-centered goverance,
is virtually absent. Perhaps, analysts thought, differences in economic
performance between the countries might be explained by institutional
differences in their governance systems.
I want to make clear at the outset that the existence of an important link
between corporate governance and corporate performance is not self-
evident. Rather, it is a hypothesis, not a revealed truth. One Japanese
economist underscored the uncertainty concerning the link's significance
with some especially vivid comments at a meeting devoted to comparative
corporate governance. After listening patiently to a non-Japanese speaker
emphasize the importance of the keiretsu structure to Japan's post-World
War II economic development, the economist rejected the notion that
Japan's competitive success was based on a corporate governance gimmick.
3. The hypothesis that bank-centered capital markets are potentially more efficient than stock
exchange based capital markets is effectively set out in JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS,
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN GERMANY ch. 2 (1994). For present purposes, I will not pursue the
debate over whether the large German banks actually play the hypothesized rote. Compare EDWARDS
& FISCHER, supra (arguing that empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that German banks
play an important governance role) with GARY GORTON & FRANK SCHMID, UNIVERSAL BANKING AND
THE PERFORMANCE OF GERMAN FIRMS, (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
5453, 1996) (providing empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that bank governance involvement
is positively related to firm performance).
4. See Erik Bergloff & Enrico Perotti, The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial
Keiretsu, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 260 (1994); Ronald Gilson & Mark Roe, Understanding the Japanese
Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871,
875 (1993). See generally MICHAEL GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
JAPANESE BUSINESS (1993); Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J.
ECON. LIT. 1 (1990).
[VOL. 74:327
1996] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Instead, he argued that the post-war miracle resulted from both the
character of the Japanese people and the situation in which Japan found
itself. After World War II, Japan had a very well educated, highly
motivated, and low-wage work force. The economist argued that these were
sufficient conditions for economic success, independent of corporate
governance institutions. More generally, one need not entirely disregard
corporate governance in order to question the relative magnitude of its
importance. For example, how does the impact of corporate governance
compare with, say, national savings rates or tax policies?5
In this paper, I seek to examine the hypothesized link between corporate
governance and economic efficiency through two different lenses that
highlight the role of national institutions: path dependency and industrial
organization. The point that I want to make is that institutions matter, but
only sometimes. The critical task facing theorists is to continue the positive
project of identifying when institutional differences influence economic
efficiency in aid of the normative project of improving the productivity of
national corporate governance systems.
I. PATH DEPENDENCY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In a path dependent environment, the influence of factors such as
increasing returns and network externalities means that an observed
equilibrium may not be the "most" efficient. Initial conditions, determined
by fortuitous events or factors traditionally viewed as non-economic, such
as culture or politics, can move the system down a particular path. Later
5. The balance of the empirical evidence measuring the importance of corporate governance as
an influence on economic performance depends on how one frames the question. Limiting the inquiry
to the American system, the object of the vast majority of studies seeking to link governance and
performance, some governance techniques, like hostile leveraged buy-outs, friendly leveraged buy-outs,
or self-initiated recapitalizations initiated to preempt a feared hostile bid, have had significant positive
effects on operating performance. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITONS 398-453 (2d ed. 1995) (collecting studies).
Evidence on the influence of particular internal governance structures is mixed. For example, the
influence of the presence of independent directors is, at best, more subtle. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard
Black, Do Independent Directors Matter? (Jan. 1996) (working paper on file with author). But this may
also be the result of imprecisely specified hypotheses concerning the mechanisms through which
independent directors influence performance. See April Klein, Firm Productivity and Board Committee
Structure (Apr. 1995) (working paper on file with author).
To the extent that the influence of internal governance techniques is context specific and the tested
hypotheses and underlying theory do not predict which contexts matter, the empirical results will reflect
a pooling of different samples. For an interesting study that addresses this problem, see Jennifer Francis
& Abbie Smith, Agency Costs and Innovation: Some Empirical Evidence, 19 J. ACCT. & ECON. 383
(1995) (linking ownership concentration and innovation).
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deviation from that path may be extremely difficult despite the existence
of alternatives that, absent transition costs, would be more efficient.6
Institutions that develop in response to conditions along the path represent
the physical embodiment of the dependency, serving in effect as the guard
rails that keep us on course. As Douglass North stated in his Nobel lecture,
"[i]nstitutions form the incentive structure of a society, and the political and
economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinants of
economic performance." 7 The difference between a traditional and path
dependent analysis of corporate governance can be seen from the recent
academic history of American corporate governance.
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, two Columbia University
professors, announced that the central feature of American corporate
governance was the separation of ownership and control.8 Although Berle
and Means had in mind a radically different agenda,9 scholars as different
6. W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92-99 (providing
an accessible survey of the concept). For present purposes, I need not distinguish between three different
types of path dependency: 1) that sensitivity to starting points exists but present conditions are not
thereby rendered inefficient, i.e, history matters; 2) that sensitivity to starting points both exists and has
resulted in an inefficient condition, but that we could not have known that an alternative starting point
would have been better when we made the choice; and 3) that the initial starting point has resulted in
inefficiency that could be remedied, either by having made an alternative choice at the outset or by
changes now, but the inefficient conditions remain. Mark Roe refers to these levels of path dependency
as weak-form, semi-strong-form, and strong-form path dependencies. Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution
in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 647-53 (1996). See also S. J. Leibowitz & Stephen
Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, I 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205,206-08 (1995). A second
level inquiry is also not pursued here: the nature of the mechanisms that lead to different types of path
dependency. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REv. 757 (1995).
7. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, Acceptance Speech upon receiving
the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (Dec. 9, 1993), in 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 359
(1994) [hereinafter North, Performance Through Time]. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) [hereinafter NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS].
In his insightful study of agrarian development in Kenya, Robert Bates follows North's lead in
stressing the dynamic role of institutions in understanding economic change: "[W]hat we learn most
clearly is the importance of institutions. Rarely do we find a direct and obvious relation between
economic change and political outcomes. Rather, we find the effects refracted, as it were, through
society's institutional endowment" ROBERT BATES, BEYOND THE MIRACLE OF THE MARKET: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 10 (1989).
8. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 4-9 (1932).
9. For Berle and Means, the separation of ownership and control left managers of large
enterprises in possession of great economic power but accountable to no one. Their normative agenda
was consistent with the general thrust of New Deal legislative efforts: government intervention to
ameliorate perceived market failures. Id.
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as free market financial economists, concerned with excessive managerial
discretion on the one hand,"0 and business historian Alfred Chandler, who
presents management as the principal engine of American industry on the
other,"1 saw this separation as efficient specialization. An increasingly
complete capital market allowed shareholders to diversify their portfolios
through the stock market and thereby specialize in risk bearing. The
presence of specialized risk bearers, in turn, opened the executive suite's
door to professional managers, who lacked the resources for ownership but
who specialized in managing.
There was one small problem with this story of evolving efficiency.
Managers and shareholders had potentially different interests: what
economists call the agency problem. Thus, for the next sixty years, the
intellectual mission of American corporate governance took the form of a
search for the organizational Holy Grail, a technique that bridged the
separation of ownership and control by aligning the interests of sharehold-
ers and managers.
In the meantime, the corporate governance systems of other nations were
largely ignored 2 because the American system was thought to represent
the evolutionary pinnacle of corporate governance. Other systems, with
different institutional characteristics, were either further behind the
Darwinian path, or at evolutionary dead ends; neither laggards nor
neanderthals compelled significant academic attention.
3
Two developments changed all that. The first, which like Berle &
Means' original insight came from Columbia, was Mark Roe's demonstra-
tion that the Berle-Means characterization of American corporate gover-
nance-dispersed shareholders, correspondingly more powerful professional
managers, a pervasive stock market, and a limited governance role for
financial intermediaries-was politically and historically contingent, a path
dependent artifact of populist politics and a federal system. 4 Statutory
10. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61.
11. See generally ALFRED CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM (1990) [hereinafter CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE]; ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 381-498 (1977).
12. A short flurry of interest in the German two-tier board system was the primary exception. See,
e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern " Corporation: Perspectives From the German, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 23, 48-89 (1966).
13. Gilson & Roe, supra note 4, at 873.
14. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE 7-8 (1994). In commenting on an earlier version of this article, Michael Klausner
observed that the path dependent influence of politics reflects not only protective constituencies that
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restrictions on the structure and activities of banks, insurance companies,
mutual funds and pension funds prevented the development of large
financial intermediaries that could serve the governance role ascribed to
German and Japanese banks.
Second, global competition developed, underscoring recognition of the
path dependency of the American system. Competition appeared to be not
just between products but also between governance systems, and, at least
for a period, the American system did not seem to be winning. If a
different path resulted in more effective institutions and more efficient
production, the need to reform domestic governance institutions was
indicated. Hostile takeovers were criticized as leading to short-term
investment horizons for American managers.' This short-term perspective
contrasted sharply with the long-term, relational investment said to be
characteristic of the German and Japanese systems. Influential study groups
urged the restructuring of the American financial system to more closely
parallel those of its competitors.' 6 From this perspective, institutional
differences, dictated by the political and historical contingencies that
influence the shape of each nation's corporate governance system, matter
a great deal.
At this point, however, we confront the second half of path dependency
analysis. Initial conditions may select the path, but the institutions that
emerge in response are subject to powerful environmental selection
mechanisms. If the institutions created along the path cannot function
effectively in comparison with those of competitors, they will not survive.
Thus, the path dependent characteristics of a given national governance
system confront the disciplining effects of the operative selection mecha-
nisms. In the end, institutions are shaped by a form of corporate gover-
nance plate tectonics, in which the demands of current circumstances grind
against the influence of initial conditions. This interaction, what Douglass
North calls "adaptive efficiency,"' 7 serves to limit the extent to which
develop, but also that politically generated institutions, like most institutions, exhibit increasing returns.
15. Peter Drucker's remarks capture the thesis: "[A] good many experienced business leaders I
know hold takeover fear to be a main cause of the decline in America's competitive strength in the
world economy... [i]t contributes to the obsession with the short term." Peter F. Drucker, Dncker on
Management: Taming the Corporate Takeover, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at 30.
16. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment
System, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 43, 43-66.
17. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 7, at 80.
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institutional differences matter;' 8 that is, the extent to which institutional
differences result in differing economic performance.
The adaptive force of selection on different corporate governance
systems is illustrated by recent empirical research on the German, Japanese
and American governance systems. The German and Japanese systems are
said to be long-term oriented, so that corporate managers can ignore short-
term swings in stock prices and accounting profits and pursue projects with
longer payback periods.' 9 The long-term, multi-dimensional relationship
between banks and corporations in bank-centered systems may provide
better information concerning actual corporate performance than short-term
stock price and accounting measures. In contrast, the American system is
said to be short-term oriented so that managers must invest in projects that
provide short-term returns readily observable by one-dimensional stock
market investors who have no other sources of information.20
The institutional characteristics of all three systems, strong financial
intermediaries in the German and Japanese systems and weak financial
intermediaries in the American system, are clearly path dependent.
However, whether these institutional differences matter-whether they
influence corporate performance in the predicted direction-is testable. For
example, any successful system must have the means to replace poorly
performing managers. If institutional differences matter, the dismissal of
American managers should be more sensitive to short-term movements in
stock prices and accounting earnings than the dismissal of German and
Japanese managers.
Empirical studies, however, do not support the hypothesized difference
between national governance systems. Despite the striking institutional
differences in their corporate governance systems, chief executive officers
in all three countries are replaced in response to poor performance, whether
measured by stock market returns or accounting earnings.2' While these
18. For an argument that the influence of path dependency is typically outweighed by adaptive
mechanisms, see Charles Sabel, Intelligible Differences on Deliberate Strategy and the Exploration of
the Possible in Economic Life (Sept. 1995) (working paper, on file with author).
19. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 16, at 67.
20. Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 64-78 (1988)
(modeling such a process).
21. See Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan
and the U.S., 102 J. POL. EcON. 510 (1994); Steven Kaplan, Top Executive, Turnover and Firm
Performance in Germany, 10 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 142 (1994); Jun-Koo Kang & Anil Shivdasani, Firm
Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 29
(1995).
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results might seem startling at first in light of popular assumptions
concerning the three systems' differing time horizons, the similarity of their
experiences can be explained by the simple impact of selection on path
dependent systems. Any corporate governance system must solve the basic
monitoring problem to succeed. A system that allows poor managers to
remain in control of corporate assets will not flourish. That the three
leading industrial economies remove senior executives under approximately
the same circumstances, despite their sharply different institutional
characteristics, reflects an outcome that is, quite literally, the result of a
selection bias: By limiting the sample only to successful systems, we
observe only systems that have solved the problem. From this perspective,
institutions do not matter in functional terms.
This is not, however, a convergence story. Each system solves the
problem in the peculiar context of its own path dependent institutions. In
evolutionary theorist Stephen Jay Gould's terms, the solutions are "jury-
rigged from a limited set of available components."22 Put differently,
selection demands the solution, and the pre-existing shape of path
dependent institutions constrains the character of the solution. In Gould's
terms again, we have "a contraption not a lovely contrivance."
Thus, we have two competing forces whose interaction frames the
question concerning the link between corporate governance and economic
efficiency. Path dependency makes institutions matter, but selection acts to
reduce the functional significance of path dependent institutional differenc-
es. Therefore, to understand the governance-efficiency link, we must
understand when institutions matter despite selection; that is, when the
forces of adaptive efficiency are less than fully effective.24 This leads to
the second prism through which I want to examine the link between
corporate governance and economic efficiency: corporate governance as an
aspect of industrial organization.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Path dependency suggests that particular governance structures develop
because of the accident of initial conditions. In this section, I focus on a
particular initial condition: the industrial organization of the corporation's
22. STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 20
(1980).
23. Id. at 24.
24. In Professor Black's terms, the question is when corporate governance is not trivial. Black,
supra note 1, at 562-77.
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productive activities. Mark Roe and I have argued elsewhere that corporate
governance institutions operate not only to harmonize relations among the
corporation and its shareholders, executives and employees, but also to
directly facilitate productive efficiency. Thus, the nature of the production
process influences the shape of corporate governance institutions.'
Understanding the interaction of path dependency and industrial organiza-
tion then sets the stage for this Article's final inquiry: When do national
corporate governance institutions matter?
Imagine that efficient production requires employees to make large, firm-
specific human capital investments; that is, investments that would be of
significantly lower value in the external labor market. The skills demanded
of employees in a lean manufacturing system are an example.26 Once
made, however, such investments are subject to employer opportunism.
Specifically, the company has an incentive to renege on the return promised
to employees for their firm-specific investment because, once made, the
employees' investment is essentially sunk.27 In this circumstance, efficient
production requires a means by which a company can credibly commit to
forgo opportunistic behavior and thereby assure the job stability necessary
for an optimal level of employee firm-specific investment. Corporate
governance institutions can provide this means.2"
From this perspective, consider bank-centered governance systems,
whose principal characteristic is said to be a long-term controlling party
uninfluenced by short-run changes in market prices or fear of takeovers.
Precisely because of their long-term participation, the main or universal
bank is thought to be less likely to behave opportunistically toward
employees than dispersed shareholders who may accept a proffered
takeover bid even though the associated premium will be financed by
anticipated wage and employment reductions.
Economists will recognize this analysis as a combination of two ideas:
25. Gilson & Roe, supra note 4, at 874.
26. See JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 48-69 (1990)
(explaining development of lean production methods in Japanese auto industry).
27. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,
in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988); Charles
Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 155 (1986).
28. A similar problem is presented when employees opportunistically threaten to quit as a means
of extracting the firm's expected returns on its sunk employee-specific investment. Post-employment
covenants not to compete address this problem, as would inter-employer agreements to suppress an
external labor market. Industrial districts combined with employee immobility may also serve as a
response to the fear of employee opportunism.
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the concern that takeovers may represent a wealth transfer from employees
to shareholders,29 and Julian Franks and Colin Mayer's argument that a
system of inside, as opposed to market, ownership, is better suited to
support implicit contracts. 0 It follows from this analysis that where
productive activity requires significant, firm-specific investment by
employees (i.e., the initial condition), the corporate governance system will
move in a direction that results in compatible, credibility enhancing,
governance institutions.
What makes the problem interesting, however, is that the need to commit
to stability, made easier by the influence of path dependency, is only one
of the links between governance and efficient production. A second link
focuses on just the opposite institutional characteristic. A company also
needs the capacity to respond quickly to changes in the competitive
environment, what I have referred to elsewhere as "mutability."'" Here
too, the governance system plays a critical role in relation to the
corporation's productive activity. But now the need is for mutability, not
stability.
From this perspective, the corporate governance system serves as an
equilibrating device, an agent of adaptive efficiency that forces the
corporation to respond when a change in the environment disrupts a
previously stable pattern. Imagine that we begin with the nexus of contracts
comprising the firm in equilibrium; that is, agency costs are at an
irreducible minimum and intra-firm incentives, including commitments to
stability, lead to efficient levels of investment. This is a world where the
traditional function of corporate governance, to provide an external check
on operating management, is decidedly second order because everything is
working well.
Now, suppose that an unexpected change occurs in the economic
environment. For any number of reasons, internal adaptive mechanisms
29. This argument is made most forcefully by Shleifer & Summers, supra note 27, at 33. See also
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 5, at 610-38.
30. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France,
Germany and the UK, 10 ECON. POL'Y 189 (1990); Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control:
A Synthesis of the International Evidence (Nov. 1992) (working paper, on file with author). Masahiko
Aoki credits the Japanese main banks with the same virtue. Aoki, supra note 4, at 14-17; MASAHIKO
AOKi, THE JAPANESE FIRM AS A SYSTEM OF ATRIuBUTES: A SURVEY AND RESEARCH AGENDA (Center
for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 288, 1992) [hereinafter AOKI, THE JAPANESE FIRM
AS A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES]. At least with respect to takeovers, this analysis is not without its
problems. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 5, at 610-38.
31. Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 162 (1992).
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may fail. For example, the change may alter the relative value of different
participants' firm-specific investments. If the investments of internal
decision makers would be devalued by adaptation to the new circumstances,
or if labor resists changes advanced by management,32 the corporation
may not respond to the change as quickly as it should and in many markets
these days, there are only the quick and the dead. Alternatively, some
changes in the competitive or economic landscape are difficult to see from
the inside. As a result, restructuring that requires reconceptualizing the
corporation is less likely to be initiated internally. 33
In these settings, the availability of external governance techniques,
especially a takeover market or outside investor pressure, provides an
important means of adaptive efficiency. For example, a broad range of
economists acknowledge that what some commentators thought of as the
worst of the 1980s style takeovers-junk-bond financed, front-end loaded,
two-tiered, bust-up takeovers34 -served quite effectively to dismantle
economically inefficient conglomerates and other companies characterized
by free cash flow, even though these companies were not "unprofitable"
measured other than in terms of opportunity cost.35 The restructuring that
was under way in the United States by the mid-1980s put American
companies ahead of Japanese and German companies that seem only now
to be confronting the need to downsize. Moreover, without adaptive
pressure of external governance mechanisms, Japanese and German
32. For example, both phenomena seem to be at work in imposing barriers to efforts to restructure
French state-owned enterprise.
33. Randall Mork et al. provide interesting empirical evidence concerning when a company's poor
performance leads to an internal governance response; that is, where the incumbent board replaces
operating management as opposed to the external governance response of a hostile takeover. Randall
Mork et al., Alternative Mechanismsfor Corporate Control, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 842 (1989). Tracking
a sample of 454 of the 1980 Fortune 500 companies over the period 1981 to 1985, the authors conclude
that an internal governance response is more likely when a company performs poorly compared to
industry competitors. Id. Hostile takeovers, in contrast, are more likely when poor performance is
industry-wide. Id. In short, hostile acquisitions appear to be associated with paradigmatic changes
concerning the nature of a target company's business. See Gilson, supra note 31, at 169-70.
34. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1987).
35. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate
Specialization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS I (Martin N. Baily
& Clifford Winston eds., 1990); William Long & David Ravenscraft, Decade of Debt: Lessons from
LBOs In the 1980s, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 205 (Margaret Blair ed. 1993).
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
companies seem to be doing so quite slowly.36
The existence of external governance mechanisms as agents of adaptive
efficiency also may be seen as a path dependent response to initial
conditions of industrial organization. In a stylized industrial history of the
United States, the organization of production concentrated on fully
capturing economies of scale.37 Because the American domestic market
was so large, production runs were long enough that specialized production
equipment could be fully amortized over a product's lifetime. Having
specialized equipment meant that producers did not need highly trained
labor and required little employee firm-specific investment. Further,
industrial capital, as opposed to firm-specific human capital, was easier for
impersonal markets to finance, an outcome consistent with the underdevel-
oped character of American financial intermediaries. The result was a
corporate governance system that was stock market dominated-thereby
exposing the corporation to outsider initiated market mechanisms that
forced the corporation to adapt, due to the simultaneous influence of history
and technology. To be sure, the resulting corporate governance system did
not facilitate the credible commitment to stability necessary for workers to
make firm-specific investments. However, this failing was without serious
consequences so long as the dominant organization of production favored
specialized machinery and unspecialized labor.38
A similarly stylized history of post-World War II Japanese industrial
patterns suggests a similar path dependent coincidence between history and
technology. In that case, however, the coincidence occurred between
governance institutions that supported a stable commitment to labor and
production technology that required substantial firm-specific employee
investment. The Japanese corporate governance system, particularly the
main bank structure, initially developed in World War II when defense
industry companies (essentially all large companies during the war) were
36. See Peter Gumbel, Job Losses Soar While Germans Fumble Real Reform, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2, 1996, at A6; Lean Enough?, THE ECONOMIsT, Feb. 10, 1996, at 59.
37. See generally CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE, supra note II.
38. The American stock market system also fostered another external engine of adaptive efficiency
not found in bank-centered systems-a venture capital market in which entirely new entrants, not the
product of an industry's path dependency, are financed. Bernard Black and I are engaged in a project
that focuses on understanding the link between venture capital markets and stock markets. For a survey
of the impact of venture capital financed new organizational forms in the pharmaceutical industry, see
Walter Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. INT. & THEO.
EcON. 197 (1996).
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authoritatively assigned to main banks by the government.39 A high
percentage of current main bank relationships date to the war years.4"
Moreover, the influence of financial intermediaries was reinforced during
the post-war period when occupier-influenced defaults by Japanese
companies on war-related bonds soured individual investors on direct
investment, leaving only the banks to finance the rebuilding of the
economy.4' The result was an intermediary dominated corporate gover-
nance system that, incidentally, lent itself to assuring certain classes of
workers lifetime employment and, it is argued, the stability necessary to
encourage worker investment in firm-specific human capital.42
The historically influenced main bank system of corporate governance
fit nicely with the manufacturing technology Japan came to rely upon in the
post-war period.43 How could Japanese companies succeed against
American competitors who could capture economies of scale when Japanese
companies could not? One approach was to focus on niche markets too
small for American competitors to challenge. A niche strategy, in turn, led
to the development of capabilities that proved to be consistent with flexible
manufacturing. Niches open and close quickly. Thus, product life spans are
too short to amortize specialized machinery. But, less specialized machinery
requires more skilled operators. Employees, in turn, require credible
commitments of stability to make the necessary levels of firm-specific
human capital investment. Again, national corporate governance institutions
are shaped by a path dependent coincidence of history and technology."
III. WHEN Do INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
The argument set out in the previous sections claims that the gross
institutional characteristics of national corporate governance systems are
39. Takeo Hoshi, Evolution of the Main Bank System in Japan, (Sept. 1993) (working paper, on
file with author); see also MASAHIKO AOKI, UNINTENDED FIT: ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION AND
GOVERNMENT DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN (Center for Economic Policy Research Paper No. 434,
1995).
40. See Hoshi, supra note 39; AoKI, supra note 39.
41. Id. The role of financial intermediaries was further strengthened by later government regulation
that restricted direct investment by individuals through the capital market. See Mark J. Roe, Some
Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan and America, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1962-65
(1993).
42. See generally Aoki, supra note 4; AoKI, THE JAPANESE FIRM AS A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES,
supra note 30.
43. See generally Aoki, supra note 4; AOKI, supra note 39.
44. Richard Nelson, The Coevolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and Supporting
Institutions (Nov. 1993) (working paper, on file with author) (reviewing the literature relying on this
form of analysis).
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path dependent, shaped by the historical and political contingencies of
particular national systems. The success of a national system, in turn,
depends on selection: The system's ability to discharge, through a
"contraption" crafted from the elements made available by history and
politics, those basic functions (like replacing senior executives) necessary
to efficient production.
But, success also depends on fortuity-how governance institutions
delivered by history and politics fit with the particular industrial state of the
world in which that nation's corporations are required to compete.
Particular institutional characteristics matter because their fit with the
dominant character of industrial production is an important determinant of
economic success.45 Thus, we have seen two quite different governance
systems that fit well with the different industrial conditions each confront-
ed. The American stock market-centered system meshed with both the path
dependent weakness of financial intermediaries and an industrial organiza-
tion driven by securing scale economies. In contrast, the Japanese bank-
centered system meshed with both the path dependent centrality of financial
intermediaries and an industrial organization characterized by the flexibility
to respond to changing niche markets that results from providing employ-
ment stability to a critical part of the work force.
The experience of the same national systems, however, illustrates a
different way in which the particular characteristics of national governance
institutions are important. When one set of industrial conditions shapes
institutional characteristics, the very aspects that accounted for success
under those prior conditions may turn out to be a barrier to success when
industrial conditions change.46
The limited ability of the American governance system to encourage
workers to make firm-specific investments was of little consequence when
production runs were large enough to amortize investment in specialized
machinery. However, this limitation became more serious in the 1980s,
when customer demand shifted in favor of a greater number of more
specialized products, and more rapid technological change reduced product
45. See Douglass C. North & John Wallis, Integrating Institutional Change and Technical Change
in Economic History: A Transaction Cost Approach, 150 J. INST. & THEo. ECON. 609 (1994) (exploring
more generally the interaction between technology and institutions, or in their terms, between
transformation and transaction costs).
46. Rebecca Henderson and Kim Clark illustrate this phenomenon on a micro-scale in their study
of shifting market leadership for successive generations of chip manufacturing technology. Rebecca
Henderson & Kim Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product
Technologies and the Failure of Existing Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 9 (1990).
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life span. Both of these factors reduced the output necessary to achieve
economies of scale in certain industries. In this environment, flexible
manufacturing, requiring more highly trained labor and less specialized
machinery, had a substantial comparative advantage. Neither the American
governance system, nor its dominant manufacturing technology, was well
suited for this new state of the world.
The Japanese system also came to suffer from a problematic mismatch
between the institutional attributes that made for success in one industrial
environment and those needed when the industrial environment changed.
Like the American governance system, the success of the Japanese system
along one governance dimension, facilitating commitment to stability, was
a barrier when new industrial conditions required different attributes, ones
that facilitated adaptability.
Masahiko Aoki, the most prominent student of Japanese corporate
governance, has offered just such an analysis. He concludes that the
Japanese system does not adapt well to rapid technological change.47 The
current difficulties of the Japanese system in reducing employment levels
in order to compete in the leaner environment of the 1990s, demonstrate
the problem posed when governance institutions do not provide an external
mechanism to force an effective response to paradigmatic changes in
industrial conditions. The cost of stability is less adaptive efficiency.
So when do institutions matter? First, institutions matter when they fit
existing industrial technology, a happy result of the coincidence of path
dependency and selection. Second, institutions matter when they do not fit
with the industrial technology demanded in a state of the world different
from that which gave rise to the governance institutions in the first place.
This suggests that, in the future, a critical characteristic of a national
governance system will be the ability to mutate in response to an ever more
quickly changing world.
From this perspective, the goal is not necessarily to seek the optimal
governance institutions for existing industrial conditions. Rather, reform of
national governance systems should strive to assure that institutional
structure facilitates prompt and low-cost organizational responses to
changes in industrial technology." This can be achieved either through
facilitating the change of existing organizations, as with the leveraged buy-
out phenomenon, or by encouraging the formation of entirely new
47. See Aoki, supra note 4, at 6-14.
48. See Gilson, supra note 31, at 174-75.
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competitors through venture capital, as with the challenge to IBM by the
personal computer.
Governance institutions that promote adaptive efficiency will matter a
great deal. Of course, this could be left to the selection process. But here,
self-interest counsels in favor of self-conscious, proactive reform. No one
is indifferent to which national systems successfully navigate these
obstacles. National governance systems provide wealth and employment to
citizens of particular nations. Each of us wants our own system to succeed.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF POST-MODERN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The analysis thus ends in a dilemma: The simultaneous influence of
history and industrial technology has led to quite different national
governance systems in which the particular strength of each is matched by
a corresponding weakness, latent in one state of the world, patent in
another. We observe either commitment or adaptability, but not both. This
dichotomy frames the current quandary: Competitive success in the future
seems to require both commitment and adaptability. The central challenge
to architects seeking to remodel existing corporate governance institutions,
or design new ones, will be how to manage the tradeoff, a balance no
existing system has yet achieved.
I want to close by offering some tentative suggestions about the shape
of that tradeoff, but with an important caveat. My suggestions are
functional, not institutional. The institutional characteristics of particular
national systems will continue to be shaped by the shadow of their unique
histories. In Gould's words, responses will be jury rigged from the
circumstances of existing path dependent institutions.49 But with that
qualification, one prediction seems reasonably straightforward: The
structure of future governance systems will be dictated by increasingly
rapid economic change and the success of any particular national system
will be influenced by how well it encourages adaptability. Because product
life cycles continue to shrink, companies, and therefore national governance
systems, must adapt to succeed. Yet, scholars of firm capabilities stress that
dynamic change is any company's single most difficult task."° Thus,
corporate governance systems have a special role to play in facilitating
adaptive efficiency, regardless of the historical characteristics of a particular
49. GOULD, supra note 22, at 20.
50. See, e.g., David Teece et al., Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management (June 1992)
(working paper, on file with author).
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national system's institutions.
This special role for governance systems in minimizing barriers to
adaptability has some straightforward implications for the redesign of
institutions. A brief example suggests the character of the analysis.
Consider two institutional structures common outside of the United States
and the United Kingdom, whose desirability has been an object of heated
debate: (i) capped voting, which limits the number of votes that may be
cast by a single shareholder regardless of the number of shares held; and
(ii) dual class voting, in which different classes of shares have different
voting rights.
Adaptability is facilitated by seeing that the economic consequences of
a company's performance are visited upon the company's decision maker.
Capped voting places ultimate control in management. Because the cap
assures that voting power will be widely dispersed, no one is left to
demand that management account for how the company has responded to
change."1 Dual class voting, by contrast, leaves control in a group with a
substantial equity investment, even if their voting power is disproportionate
to their ownership. Thus, the decision maker at least remains exposed to the
economic consequences of his or her decisions.5 2
Codetermination is a second institution that might warrant re-evaluation
when considered from the perspective of a tradeoff between commitment
and adaptability. The increasing pace of technological change likely will
force workers to bear a higher level of risk with respect to their firm-
specific human capital investments. In other words, competition simply may
not allow subsidization of workers whose human capital has been devalued
by technological change. 3 The problem posed by the tradeoff between
commitment and adaptability results from the barriers to successful
51. Capped voting has a different impact in Germany, where it serves to assure voting control in
the large banks. Because the cap does not apply to shares held by the bank as custodian, and because
the bulk of the bank's voting power comes from custodial shares, the bank's voting control is locked
in. See generally Gorton & Schmid, supra note 3; Roe, Johannes Kdndgen, Duties of Banks in Voting
Their Clients 'Stock, in INSTrTUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 531 (Theodor Baums
et al. eds., 1993). Whether German universal banks have the right incentives, or the power, to assure
management responsiveness to quickly changing circumstances remains controversial. See supra note
3 and accompanying text.
52. See Gilson, supra note 31, at 185.
53. To avoid imposing greater risk on inefficient risk bearers and thereby decreasing the level of
worker investment, the analysis also suggests that competition may force the shift of the risk sharing
function from the company-by means of assured employment-to the state-by means of transition
training and benefits. See Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be
Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 315, 318-21 (1993).
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bargaining when information asymmetries exist between the parties.
In this context, the corporate governance tradeoff is presented when
company management announces that a technological change has devalued
firm-specific worker investment. Capital and labor then bargain over the
consequences for wage and employment levels. But, the bargaining is
burdened by an information asymmetry along at least two dimensions: The
parties have different information concerning both the existence and the
impact of the technological change. Is management conscientiously
responding to a changing competitive environment, or is management
opportunistically seeking to transfer wealth from workers to shareholders
by falsely representing that an unfavorable technological change has
occurred at all? Has management fairly stated the impact of the change on
the value of labor's firm-specific human capital, or has management
opportunistically exaggerated the devaluation to favor shareholders at the
expense of labor?
The informational differences between management and labor critically
influence the corporate governance system's ability to facilitate the tradeoff
between commitment and adaptability. Game theory literature demonstrates
that the players in bargaining games with asymmetric information often fail
to reach a resolution even though gains from trade are available. However,
when information concerning the subject of the bargain is symmetric, the
likelihood of success increases dramatically. 4 Governance systems could
facilitate a tradeoff between commitment and adaptability by reducing the
extent of information asymmetry between the bargaining parties. This is
where the potential contribution of codetermination appears.
Board membership, whether supervisory or unitary, gives labor no formal
power when capital retains ultimate voting control (as is the case in
Germany, where tie-breaking power resides with the supervisory board
chairman, who is chosen by shareholders). However, board membership for
labor could serve to significantly reduce the information asymmetry that
threatens a successful negotiation of the tradeoff. Suppose procedures were
devised so that board membership assured labor of the identical information
given shareholder representatives.5 Although this would not eliminate
54. See PAUL MILGROM &JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION& MANAGEMENT 140-43
(1992) (canvassing game-theory literature in an accessible fashion).
55. In the United States, for example, this result would flow from the general rights of directors.
Whether labor membership on the supervisory board actually serves this function depends on the
character of information provided members. Edwards and Fischer suggest that only limited information
is provided to the supervisory board, see EDWARDS & FISHER, supra note 3, at 129-30, 213-14, which
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hard distributive negotiations between capital and labor over how losses
from technological change would be shared, the bargaining game would be
played under the more favorable conditions of symmetric information, with
a corresponding increase in the likelihood of a favorable resolution. 6 In
short, a particular corporate governance feature like labor board representa-
tion might facilitate the tradeoff between commitment and adaptability in
a world of rapid technological change.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The academic inquiry concerning the link between corporate governance
and economic efficiency is at a very preliminary stage: Firm conclusions
about the nature of that link remain very difficult to draw. Thus, I will end
my commentary with an observation. Much of the existing corporate
governance literature is static in character: What institutional structure best
responds to a given problem? As we increasingly realize that history and
politics, and therefore institutions, matter, I expect that the next generation
of corporate governance scholarship will be dynamic: How do existing
institutions come to respond to a changing array of problems? The shift in
emphasis reflects an altered scholarly agenda-how a system moves from
one equilibrium to the next may come to attract more interest than the
characteristics of a particular equilibrium. More important, it may turn
out that equilibria are increasingly less important as the pace of change
reduces the time spent in equilibrium and, hence, increases the importance
of disequilibrium."
may result in bank members receiving information critical to bargaining through other facets of the
bank's multi-dimensional relation with the firm, therefore reinforcing rather than reducing the
information asymmetry between capital and labor.
56. For an interesting analysis of post-deregulation employee ownership in the airline industry as
a response to bargaining problems concerning the impact of deregulation on labor and capital, see
Jeffrey Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership as a Transition Device: The Case of Airlines (Fall 1995)
(working paper, on file with author). For example, where bargaining over the relative values of labor
and capital contributions fails, an employee buyout, where the value of capitals' interest can be assessed
by reference to an independent market price, may provide the better bargaining structure. Id.
57. See North, Performance Through Time, supra note 7, at 360.
58. See Gilson, supra note 31, at 174-75.
